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Abstract: The perception of time is culturally conditioned which means that in different 
cultures time may be experienced – perceived, conceptualized and evaluated – in 
diverse ways. The distinction between past, present and future seems to be a universal 
phenomenon, but the relations of these categories may be different in different 
cultural codes. The author defines two models of temporal perception, ‘historical’ and 
‘cosmological’, analysing the conceptualization of time in each of them.1
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And I confess to you, Lord, that I still do not know 
what time is, and then again I confess to you, 
Lord, that I do know that I am saying these things 
in time [...]. But how do I know this, when I do 
not know what time is? Or by “not knowing” do 
I perhaps mean simply that I do not know how to 
express something which is in fact known to me?
Saint Augustine2
1 Th e present paper was prepared for a lecture held in Madrid in 2010 (Congreso de Semió-
tica de la Cultura, Círculo de Bellas Artes, Madrid). It is based on the second part of the two-
part article published by the author under the title “History and semiotics (the perception of 
time as a semiotic problem)” in Russian in Sign Systems Studies, vols. 22 and 23 (Uspenskij 
1988; 1989). Its present version has not been published before.
2 Confessions, XI, 32. Augustine 1963[ca 400]: 277–278.
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Nous ne nous tenons jamais au temps présent. 
Nous rappelons le passé; nous anticipons l’avenir 
comme trop lent à venir, comme pour hâter son 
cours, ou nous rappelons le passé pour l’arrêter 
comme trop prompt, si imprudents que nous 
errons dans des temps qui ne sont point nôtres, et 
ne pensons point au seul qui nous appartient, et si 
vains que nous songeons à ceux qui ne sont rien, et 
échappons sans réflexion le seul qui subsiste.
Pascal3
The perception of time is certainly culturally conditioned, which means that 
in different cultures time may be experienced  – perceived, conceptualized and 
evaluated – in diverse ways. The distinction between past, present and future seems 
to be a universal phenomenon, but the relations of these categories may be drastically 
different in different cultural codes.
It should be emphasized that what is past, what is present, and what is future is 
basically a semiotic problem. Indeed, different types of semiosis may be traced, for 
example, when we evaluate our present from the perspective of our past or when 
we do it from the perspective of our future; or when we evaluate our past from the 
perspective of our present, and so on. Thus, the perception of time appears to be one 
of the main objects of study of the semiotics of culture.
It seems appropriate to distinguish two possible approaches to time or, rather, 
two models of temporal perception (two types of consciousness) which may be 
conventionally defined as ‘historical’ and ‘cosmological’. 
The historical approach organizes events relating to our past into a causative series. 
Events of the past are then viewed consecutively as the result of some other, earlier 
events. Thus, the historical consciousness always presupposes a reference to some 
preceding situation – but not the initial one! – which, in its turn, is causally related to 
yet another, even earlier, preceding situation, and so on.
The cosmological approach, on the other hand, entails the relation of events to a 
certain primeval state, a first time, which never disappears in the sense that its effects 
continue to be realized throughout the temporal process. Events which occur in this 
primeval time form a text which is constantly repeated (reproduced) in the events 
that follow. This ontologically initial text which in one way or another is related in our 
consciousness to all following events corresponds to what is customarily understood 
by the concept of ‘myth’.
*
3  Pensées, no. 47. Pascal 1963[ca 1662]: 506. 
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Both ways of conceptualizing the past may determine the perception of the present. In 
other words, either the historical or the cosmological model of temporal experience 
worked out from a particular perception of the past may be imposed upon the present.
In the framework of historical consciousness, that is, when the historical model of 
temporal experience is projected onto the present, events in the present are evaluated 
from the perspective of the future as it is seen at the given moment. Present events 
are therefore causally related to the predicted events of the future and are evaluated 
according to their possible consequences. The significance of the results dictates 
which events are perceived as significant and, conversely, which events are evaluated 
as insignificant insofar as they have no foreseeable serious consequences.4
Thus, the significance of events is determined by projecting them onto the future, 
that is, by their perception from the perspective of the anticipated (modelled) future. 
In other words, in this case the semiotic status of events in the present is conditioned 
by our assessment of their capacity to affect other, future events (that is, by their 
causative role).
However, the future is not open to us, it is not our province, and we cannot 
really know the consequences of the present events. We can only guess what their 
consequences may be. Our reactions are thus determined by subjective rather than 
objective factors, not by the essence of things, but by our notions of causal relations. It 
is only these relations that are actually within our scope.
In the framework of cosmological consciousness, on the other hand, when the 
cosmological model of temporal experience is projected onto the present, events in the 
present are perceived as significant in as far as they relate not to a future state, but to an 
initial state in the past. Present events are seen as the reflection of this primeval past. 
The present is evaluated in this case not in terms of the future, but in terms of the past. 
In other words, the present is not viewed as anticipating the future, but it is viewed as 
a manifestation of an initial state. The semiotic status of present events, thus, depends 
on their role, not as causes, but as consequences, since they are seen as preordained by 
events of the primeval time.5
If in this process the events of the present are connected to the future, this 
connection is not a causal connection, but rather a symbolic one. In the cosmological 
model, causal connections do not link the present and the future, but rather they 
4 Cf.: “Nous ne sommes jamais chez nous; nous sommes tousjours au delà; la crainte, le désir, 
l’espérance nous élancent vers l’avenir, et nous dérobent le sentiment de la considération de ce qui 
est, pour nous amuser à ce qui sera, voire quand nous ne serons plus” (Montaigne 1962[1580]: 
11, no. I–3). Cf. also Pascal’s thought quoted in the beginning.
5 Naturally causal relationships are conceptualized diff erently from historical and cosmolo-
gical perspectives: the very concept of causality depends on one’s conceptual framework. Cf., 
in this connection, the opposition between mythological and non-mythological thought, 
Lotman, Uspenskij 1977.
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connect some primeval state both with the present and with the future. The present 
and the future are thus connected not directly, but indirectly – by way of this initial, 
integral and omnipresent state.
So, events of the present are not conceptualized as having generated the future, but 
they may be viewed as portents of the future. What occurs in the present and what may 
occur in the future is seen – within the framework of cosmological consciousness – 
as a reflection or symbolic representation of the initial state, actually as signs of that 
state. The connection between these signs is encoded, so to say, in the world’s design. 
If we know (even if only partially) the connection, then we can predict the future by 
referring to events of the present, following the guidelines, not of profane experience, 
but of cosmological notions of how the universe is constructed; that is why all kinds 
of predictions are so often mentioned in early historical accounts.6 Correspondingly, 
the present reflects the past and portends the future.
Thus, the cosmological perception of the present, which conditions the 
semiotization of current events, is oriented towards the past, while the historical 
perception is oriented towards the future. A historical perspective evaluates current 
events on the basis of our ideas of what the future holds, while a cosmological 
perspective evaluates them on the basis of our notions of the past.7
The historical and cosmological models of time may actually co-exist in our 
experience. In its relatively pure form the historical model is often realized in 
scientific notions (for example, in evolutionary biology), while the cosmological 
6 It is primarily the coordination with the cosmological order, and not their profane prag-
matical value, that makes predictions signifi cant. If predictions are not fulfi lled this does not 
necessarily mean that they are not true. Cf. the words of Quintus, Cicero’s brother and an 
apologist for divination, in Cicero’s treatise De divinatione (I, § LVI, 128): “[...] It is not strange 
that diviners have a presentiment of things that exist nowhere in the material world: for all 
things ‘are’, though, from the standpoint of time, they are not present” (Cicero 1969–1988[ca 
43 BC]: XX: 363). Th us things can exist outside of time, and diviners are able to see them 
independent of their manifestation in time.
 Quite analoguosly in the framework of historical consciousness anticipations based 
on cause-eff ect relations can be regarded as true and justifi ed even if they are not realized. 
Guicciardini (1890: 161) wrote: “Although we act on the best advice, yet, so uncertain is the 
future, the results are oft en contrary. Still we are not on that account to give ourselves up like 
beasts a prey to Fortune, but like men to walk by Reason. And he who is truly wise should be 
better pleased to have been guided by good advice though the result be untoward...”. In both 
cases the knowledge of how the world is organized is actually recognized as far more important 
than any kind of experience.
7  An important diff erence, however, is the fact that the historical consciousness assumes that 
the future does not exist, and therefore accepts the relativity of all knowledge of the future, 
while the knowledge of the past, so vital for the cosmological consciousness, is regarded as 
entirely reliable (see below).
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model is realized in religious notions. This applies equally to the individual and 
collective consciousness. Indeed, man, as a collective or individual personality, may 
live simultaneously in the projection of the two types of consciousness (or, rather, in 
the projection of the two types of perception) when the same events are explained as 
causative laws and as a repetition of earlier states. Thus, one and the same event may 
simultaneously relate both to the cosmological past and to the historical future. Each 
orientation entails a different type of semiosis.
It is noteworthy that Christian dogma represents an unusually striking instance 
of a combined cosmological and historical orientation. Christ is both God and Man, 
and as the God-Man Christ simultaneously represents a cosmological principle and a 
historical process. Indeed, Christ is God the Son and God the Word (the hypostases 
of the Trinity) which “was in the beginning” (John 1: 1–3) and is the “beginning of 
the creation of God” (Rev. 3: 14), “the beginning and the ending” (Rev. 1: 8; 21: 6; 22: 
13). According to the Creed, He was born of God the Father “before all ages”. And 
Christ says of Himself: “before Abraham was, I am” (John 8: 58). Remarkably, the 
tense of the verb in this sentence contradicts the rules of secular grammatical usage, 
for the form of the present, “am” (Greek εἰμί), refers to a state that existed earlier than 
the state that is expressed by the past form “was” (Greek γενέσθαι). The sentence is 
distinctly ungrammatical because the meaning is above grammar, outside our profane 
experience.8 All this corresponds to the cosmological model of time.
However, Christ’s earthly incarnation, from His birth to His resurrection, is related 
to the historical developments of events and, therefore, also belongs to history. Indeed, 
He was born “in the days of Herod” (Matt. 2: 1), and the Gospel of St Matthew begins 
with a genealogy of His paternal ancestors, beginning with Abraham and ending with 
Joseph (Matt. 1: 1–16; cf. Luke 3: 23–38). This inscription into history, the temporal 
concreteness of events in the Gospels, is especially stressed in the Creed, exactly where 
the earthly incarnation of Christ is described: “[He] was crucified for us under Pontius 
Pilate, and suffered and was buried”. The name of Pontius Pilate, a concrete historical 
person, refers us to a concrete historical period.
This amalgamation of the cosmological and the historical, of the eternal and the 
temporal, is of essential importance: it is the manifestation of the divine and human 
natures of Christ. The cosmological consciousness naturally corresponds to the divine 
element, while the historical consciousness corresponds to the human element. This 
dual perspective is characteristic of the orthodox Christian viewpoint developed in 
the process of theological discussions from the 4th to the 5th centuries which treated 
the incarnation of Christ not as the Divinity’s assumption of a material form, but as 
the real conjunction of the divine and human natures in a single person. The opposite 
position is professed by the Monophysites (who believe that following the incarnation 
8 Cf. in this respect statements against grammar in the Middle Ages. See Uspenskij 1992: 494 ff .
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of God’s Son in human form, Christ had a single, divine nature) and by the Nestorians 
(who believe that Christ is a human with whom the Son of God was temporarily 
merged).9 So dogmatically it turns out to be extremely significant.
Thus, the events of the Gospel are coordinated with the historical process, but 
may still be experienced as cosmological. One may believe, in particular, that Christ is 
constantly being born,10 that He is continually being crucified, and so on. In this way 
the incarnation conditions a dual perception of time in the Christian conception of 
history, that is, the dual perspective of the historical process – insofar as the historical 
process corresponds with this culminating event.
This dual perspective seems to be typical of the medieval Christian historiography. 
Elsewhere I have tried to demonstrate that the notion of Moscow as the Third Rome, 
developed in Russia at the turn of the 15th and 16th centuries, had both a cosmological 
and historical foundation in the contemporary consciousness of that epoch (see 
Uspenskij 2002). Side by side with a sequential unfolding of events which was seen as 
the realization of certain causative laws, a return to a kind of initial state was postulated. 
The new role of Muscovy was thus determined both by the immediately preceding 
events (such as the religious union of Constantinople and Rome in 1439, the Fall of 
Constantinople in 1453, the overthrow of Tatar rule in Russia in 1480) and by events of 
the cosmological past (such as the Creation of the World, the Creation of the Church, 
and the Creation of the first Christian Empire). In other words, events in the present that 
are current in the given epoch are seen both as the result of some other events which 
directly preceded in the past and as the manifestation of the cosmological past.
9 Incidentally, all these opinions can be traced in Russian heresies of the 16th–17th centuries. 
Th us, Russian heretics of the mid-16th century refused to recognize the double nature of 
Christ (see Koreckij 1963: 334–360). Some heretics (such as Feodosij Kosoj or Matvej Bashkin) 
would not recognize the divine nature of Christ, while others (such as Vassian Patrikeev) did 
not recognize the human nature. At the beginning of the 17th century Elder Filaret, a monk 
of the Troitse-Sergiev Monastery, taught that Christ “was not born of Father before the ages, 
but was born when the Archangel Gabriel brought the good tidings to the Most Holy Virgin 
Mary” (Azarjin, Nasedka 1855: 63). We can see here an eff ort to escape from the coincidence 
of cosmological and historical concepts of time by locating events of the Gospel on the plane 
of historical consciousness.
10 As Petrus Lombardus put it, “Christ will be born, is being born, and was born”. Correspon-
dingly Meister Eckhart begins his sermon devoted to Christmas with the words: “We celebrate 
here in temporality with a view to the eternal birth, which God the Father has accomplished 
and accomplishes unceasingly in eternity, so that this same birth has now been accomplished 
in time within human nature” (Eckhart 1980: 292). Th e opposition of cosmological and 
historical is presented here as the opposition of eternal and temporal: what is being unceasingly 
accomplished in eternity appears for us in time, that is, on the historical plane. According to 
Meister Eckhart, time is correlated with the perceiving human being, not with the perceived 
ontological reality.
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Incidentally, the cosmological model of time perception may be foregrounded, 
or symbolically resurrected, in the perception of historical events which inaugurate 
a new era that is assumed to be significant for all mankind or for the fate of a given 
people. An example from Russian history is the perception of the Petrine period which 
had a clear mythological character: it was based on the belief of the total rebirth of 
the country. Peter the Great was seen as the demiurge of a new world, the creator of a 
new Russia and a new nation.11 And later the Russian Revolution was understood in 
a similar way.
In such cases, historical consciousness yields to cosmological one which compels 
the historical process to be perceived in mythological categories and terms. Insofar as 
the cosmological consciousness has religious connotations, it may lead to something 
like the sacralization of historical figures. Hence both Peter and Lenin became 
sanctified: both men actually became mythological figures in Russian history.
*
So far I have been discussing the perception or conceptualization of the past and the 
present, but what of the perception of the future? 
The perception of the future differs substantially from the perception of the 
present and the past in the sense that the future must be perceived through reflection 
(premediation) rather than through direct experience. Indeed, the present and the past 
are part of our individual experience, whereas the future is not given to us and can be 
perceived only by a speculative process – so to speak, metaphysically. It is natural to 
model our conception of the future basing on the experience which conditions our 
perception of the present and the past.
Incidentally, the special status of the future time is reflected in the expression of 
the grammatical category of tense in many languages. Some languages grammatically 
distinguish between present, past, and future. Others distinguish past from the non-past 
but have no grammatical category for future.12 We can probably make the generalized 
supposition that all languages which possess the category of tense distinguish the past, 
whereas the distinction of future does not appear to be obligatory. Characteristically, in 
some languages forms of the irreal mood may come to signify the future time.
So the future can be treated differently according to different cultural codes and 
the conception of the future is actually based on the interpretation of the relation 
between the present and the past. On the one hand, the present may be perceived from 
the perspective of the past and understood as that which appeared out of the past, 
11 Concerning the perception of Peter I in mythological terms, see Lotman, Uspenskij 1977: 
242–243; Lotman, Uspenskij 1984: 62–63; Uspenskij, Živov 1983: 40–45. Cf. also Uspenskij 1977.
12 Th is is the case, for example, in Church Slavonic and Old Russian.
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which was born of the past. This perception may determine, in its turn, our perception 
of the future. Insofar as the future has not yet been experienced, we do not know what 
will actually occur in that time, although we can guess what might happen. However, 
we do know – we remember – that at one time the present also did not exist, and that 
our present is the future in relation to the former past (which at that time naturally 
was the present). By the same token, the present is past in relation to the as yet non-
existent future, that is to say, the present will become the past when the future becomes 
the present. Thus, the present is the future in the past and the past in the future.
The relation between the past and the present may be transferred to the relation 
between the present and the future, that is, the future may be conceptualized by 
analogy with the present. The perception of the future from the perspective of the 
present is determined then by the perception of the present from the perspective of 
the past. It is understood as that present which will arise in the future and in relation 
to which the current present will become the past.
The present, in its turn, may also be conceptualized by analogy with the future, 
that is, the experience of perceiving the future may, in a secondary way, be applied 
to the present. Just as one can model (predict) the future, basing this prediction on 
the present, one can also make a conventional model of the present based on the 
past, evaluating unrealized possibilities (that is, asking questions such as: What 
would have happened had the past turned out differently? How can events that might 
have happened in the past be reflected in the present?). In doing this we deliberately 
ignore the fact that the present has already been realized in a certain form, and thus 
we discuss not the actual present, but a present that is potentially possible from the 
perspective of the past. By taking the past perspective we actually treat the present as 
the future which does not yet exist (from the viewpoint of that past). Correspondingly 
we may construct various hypotheses relating to the present.
Mental operations of this sort are typical of our consciousness, a fact that is attested 
in the widespread grammatical category known as the subjunctive mood. Indeed, the 
subjunctive mood serves to express potentially possible conditions. It expresses that 
which actually does not exist but which under certain conditions might have come to 
existence. These conditions, in turn, are expressed by forms of the conditional mood. 
Significantly, the conditional mood is usually formed – in various languages – with 
the help of verbal forms in the past tense which seems to presume some reference 
to a condition existing in the past: in this past perspective, what is expressed in the 
conditional mood was still possible.13
13 Characteristically, an unrealized condition which could infl uence the future development 
of events (the future seen from the past perspective) can be expressed in some languages (e.g. 
in English or Old Russian) by verb forms in the past perfect tense. 
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This possibility of modelling the historical process by turning to the past, thus 
replaying and reconsidering various situations that might have occurred but did not 
actually occur, appears to determine the methodological specificity of history as a 
scholarly discipline. Theoretically speaking, history should be written, so to say, in the 
subjunctive mood – to put it metaphorically: it should discuss not only what actually 
has happened, but also what could have happened under certain conditions, that is, it 
should reveal and revaluate all the options.14
Let us return to the conception of future in the historical model of temporal 
perception. In this model the future appears as time which does not exist. The future 
is that which will be born of the present, just as the present was born of the past. This 
time has yet to come. When it does come into being, it will naturally no longer be the 
future, it will become the present. In this way, the evolutionary, prospective notion of 
the movement of time, of the historical process imposes itself upon our perception of 
the future. This notion is naturally written into the historical consciousness.15
14 Such an approach presupposes, of course, the introduction of reasonable restric tions, as 
well as the evaluation of the probability of various options. However, a historian is hardly 
justifi ed in regarding the actual development of events as the only possible one.
15 St Augustine, who in general acts as a bearer of the historical consciousness, constantly 
stresses that the future does not exist, but must still come into being. In Confessions (XI, 23–24), 
he writes, for example: “[...] We oft en premeditate our future actions, and this premeditation 
is present [occurs in the present], while the action which we are premeditating, being in the 
future, does not yet exist. But when we have embarked on it and begun to do what we were 
premeditating, then that action will exist, because then instead of being in the future, it will be 
in the present [...] Nothing can be seen which does not exist. And what is already in existence 
is not future, but present. Th erefore, when we speak of seeing the future, what is seen is not 
the actual future itself (which, being future, does not yet exist), but the causes, or perhaps the 
signs of that future – causes and signs which are already in existence. And so to those who see 
them, they are not future, but present, and from them future events are conceived in the mind 
and predicted. Th ese concepts, again, are already in existence, and by those who make the 
predictions they are contemplated as being present in the mind... Th e future, therefore, is not 
yet, and if it is not yet, it does not exist, and if it does not exist, it is quite impossible for it to be 
seen. But it can be predicted from the present which is already in existence and which can be 
seen” (Augustine 1963[ca 400]: 271).
Th e problem of existence of the future and the past is also discussed in Buddhist literature. 
Th us the Sautrāntika school denies the reality of the past and the future, admitting only 
the reality of the present: according to this school, the future was not real before becoming 
present, and the past was not real aft er having been present. Meanwhile the Vaibhāṣika school 
maintains that the past and the future “are existent in reality” together with the present. Th e 
Vaibhāṣikas refer to the words of Buddha who has said: “there ‘is’ a past and there ‘is’ a future”. 
Th e Sautrāntikas object: “If the past and the future exist in the same sense as the present, as 
realities, why is it, then, that, being existent in the same sense, they are future and past? If 
the substance of the same element is alone (permanently) existent, what is the reason that 
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One may say that the past and the future are recognized as not equal in their 
existential status, they do not appear to be isomorphic. The past is that which existed 
in its time, while the future still awaits its existence; the existence of the past is not 
dependent on the existence of the present, while the existence of the future depends 
directly on it. We know the past, but can only guess about the future. The past is 
given to us as a sequentially organized text, whereas only individual (fragmented) 
moments of the future can be divined. Our knowledge of the past is concrete, while 
our knowledge of the future is more abstract, and so on. We know that the past 
was, that the present is, and that the future will be. But ‘was’ and ‘is’ actually have a 
different relationship to each other than ‘is’ and ‘will be’: there is no symmetry here. 
If something was, it is something about which, in the past, it was possible to say: ‘it 
is’ (there was a situation when we could say that). If something will be, it is first and 
foremost something which does not yet exist. If something was, then it is something 
which is not now, but not something which has no existence at all. If something will 
be, it is something which is not now and which has no existence as yet.16 This is clearly 
the historical model of temporal perception.
On the other hand, the past may be perceived from the perspective of the present, 
and this notion may likewise determine the perception of the future. From this 
perspective, the future is conceptualized as analogous to the past; the perception of 
the future from the perspective of the present is determined by the perception of the 
past in that same perspective. Like the past, the future is conceptualized as something 
that does not exist in the immediately perceptible reality. By the same token, the 
future does exist in the same way that the past exists. Both are part of some other 
reality, something that exists but is not accessible to direct sensory perception, for it 
it is spoken of as “having not yet appeared” or “gone”?... Th us, it is that the notion of three 
times will altogether have no real foundation, as long as you don’t accept the view that the 
elements appear into life out of non-existence and return again into non-existence aft er having 
been existing”. Th ey treat Buddha’s words in the sense that the word ‘is’ virtually refers to the 
language of description, not to the described universe: “For the word ‘is’ acts as a particle 
(which may refer to something existent and to non-existence as well). As e.g. people will say: 
“there is absence of light” (before it has been kindled), “there is absence of light aft er (it has 
been put out)” [...] When Buddha declared that there “is” a past and there “is” a future, he used 
the word “is” in that sense” (Stcherbatsky 1961: 64–66, 72–73, cf. 36).
16 We are deliberately setting aside the question of the meaning of ‘is’, whose defi nition 
presents obvious diffi  culties. Disputes regarding the existence of God, for example, generally 
come down to disputes about the nature of existence rather than the nature of God. In other 
words, the disagreements are not so much about the word ‘God’, as about the word ‘is’, which 
is quite diffi  cult to defi ne and which admits of many interpretations. Without attempting to 
defi ne ‘is’, then, let us point out that ‘was’ is closer to ‘is’ in the given temporal context than ‘will 
be’. Presumably, the meaning of the word ‘is’ becomes a component in the meaning of ‘was’ and 
is absent in the meaning of ‘will be’.
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is located outside our actual experience, outside our vision. The past and the future 
then become entirely equal in their existential status, they are distinguished only 
empirically, but not existentially. The difference between them depends entirely on 
our varying experiences (insofar as we have not experienced the future, but we have 
already experienced the past), but not on the reality of their own existence. The future 
is perceived as something which already exists somewhere, but has not reached us yet. 
We might say that, like the past, the future is given to us as a sequentially organized 
text, but it is a text which we have not yet read.
This notion of the future is part of the cosmological model of temporal perception. 
Indeed, in the cosmological consciousness, as we know, all events reflect some primary, 
initial state (the beginning of time) which is bound equally to the present, future, and 
past.17 They are differentiated not by their existential status, but by their relation to the 
experience of the perception. Time is seen not as constantly arising, but as existing: 
it may be conceptualized as something which has been created. The notion of the 
creation of time is determined by the notion of the creation of the world.
While in the instance examined above – when the historical model of temporal 
perception was discussed  – the perception of the future is based on the idea of 
evolution, coming-into-being, developing, in this case it is based on the idea of 
predestination. Just as a text of past events exists, there exists a text of future events, 
of all that is predestined to come into being. That text may be accessible in varying 
degrees to seers and clairvoyants who are able to perceive what occurs in another 
place or another time. The capacity to see into the future may also be acquired during 
certain rituals which we would regard as magical. This can be illustrated by all kinds 
of fortune-telling as well as by recourse to oracles.18
It is noteworthy that in principle the text of the future may even be accessible to 
perception, but it is assumed in this case that ordinary people without supernatural 
powers cannot read it – that is, they are incapable of receiving the information con-
tained in it. Especially characteristic here is the description of the miraculous columns 
of Constantinople in Robert of Clari’s account of the conquest of Constantinople by 
the crusaders at the beginning of the 13th century. Robert of Clari speaks about the 
17 Here the term ‘past’ means events of the previous time which do not directly relate to the 
initial time – it is possible to qualify it as the empirical past.
18 Since the historical consciousness correlates the temporal process with the arising of a new 
state, not with returning to a previous state, time is conceived as irreversible. Otherwise we 
could both predict our future and reconstruct our past. Cf. Schlegel’s defi nition of the historian 
as a prophet predicting backwards: “Der Historiker ist ein rückwärts gekehrter Prophet” 
(Schlegel 1905: 59). Th e cosmological consciousness does not exclude such an opportunity. 
Th us, in particular, time is acknowledged to be reversible in Buddhist thought: the aspiring 
Boddhisattva reverses time’s fl ow, retracing all his previous existences in an inverted order. See 
Mus 1939; Eliade 1973: 188; Needham 1965: 47, note 3.
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columns of Theodosius the Great in the Forum of Theodosius (the Tauros), erected 
in 386, and of Arcadius in the Forum of Xerolophos, erected in 403; they were 
modelled on the column of Trajan in Rome. Both columns were covered with bas-
reliefs illustrating various historical events, both of the past and of the future. The 
Greeks (the inhabitants of Byzantium) considered that what was depicted there to be 
prophecies of the Sibyl. These prophecies were thus accessible to perception, but the 
meaning of the illustrations remained hidden until the corresponding events actually 
occurred, – and then they would naturally lose the character of prophecies. Robert of 
Clari writes: 
On the outside of these columns there were pictured and written by prophecy 
all the events and all the conquests which have happened in Constantinople or 
which were going to happen. But no one could understand the event until it had 
happened; and when it had happened the people would go there and ponder over 
it, and then for the first time they would see and understand the event. And even 
this conquest of the French was written and pictured there [i.e. the invasion by 
the crusaders about which Robert of Clari narrates – B.U.] and the ships in which 
they made the assault when the city was taken; and the Greeks were not able to 
understand it before it had happened, but when it had happened they went to look 
at these columns and ponder over it, and they found that the letters which were 
written on the pictured ships said that a people, short haired and with iron swords, 
would come from the West and conquer Constantinople. (Robert de Clari 1966: 
110–111, cf. 1924: 89)
What is telling here is the desire to read the text, even though the reading itself no 
longer has any practical meaning: the prophesied event has already occurred, but its 
relation to the text of the prophecy nevertheless turns out to be highly important. The 
reading of the book of universe has an immanent value, which is basically independent 
of the pragmatics of daily life. It permits the correlation of events with Providence and 
thus fills them with meaning.19
It seems appropriate to consider in this connection an intellectual experiment 
suggested by Norbert Wiener who wants us to imagine “an intelligent being whose 
time should run the other way to our own”. According to Wiener,
To such a being, all communication with us would be impossible. Any signal he 
might send would reach us with a logical stream of consequents from his point 
of view, antecedents from ours. These antecedents would already be in our 
19 As other sources show, however, some citizens of Constantinople attempted to attack 
these depictions with stones and hammers, assuming that they might thus be able to turn the 
prophecy against the conquerors. Th e magic battle against the depictions is seen here as almost 
more eff ective than the battle against the conquerors themselves. See Robert de Clari 1966: 
110–111; 1924: 89.
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experience, and would have served to us as the natural explanation of his signal, 
without presupposing an intelligent being to have sent it. If he drew us a square, 
we should see the remains of his figure as its precursors, and it would seem to be 
the curious crystallization – always perfectly explainable – of these remains. Its 
meaning would seem to be as fortuitous as the faces we read into mountains and 
cliffs. The drawing of the square would appear to us as a catastrophe – sudden 
indeed, but explainable by natural laws – by which that square would cease to 
exist. Our counterpart would have exactly similar ideas concerning us. Within 
any world with which we can communicate, the direction of time is uniform. 
(Wiener 1961: 34–35)20
The situation described by Wiener is actually close to the cosmological picture of 
the world: indeed, the future is seen here as objectively existing, even though it is not 
accessible to our perception (for us it does not yet exist).21 This cosmological picture, 
however, is described in terms of historical consciousness which presupposes, as we 
know, the establishment of causal relations between preceding and following states.
If the future state exists, we cannot situate it in the framework of historical 
consciousness. However, we can describe the cosmological picture of the world in 
terms of historical consciousness if we imagine two time streams moving in opposite 
directions – from our present to our future and from our future to our present. 
The time stream which moves towards us – from our future to our present – is not 
conceivable in the framework of historical consciousness; but it can be conceived of 
within the cosmological framework. The switching over to the cosmological model 
transforms the causal relations into symbolic links: the present is then not seen as 
a basis for the future, but as its portent. What our vis-à-vis (the observer who is 
located in our future, whose time flow runs in the opposite direction from ours) sees 
as movement of historical time (when every new status is born out of one directly 
preceding it with their relations seen as causal), may be seen by us merely as a symbol 
of future events, as their herald: otherwise this temporal process would not enter into 
our conception of time. Thus, in the example under discussion, a square created by our 
vis-à-vis and sent to us from our future, may be perceived by us either as a suggestion 
of a square, that is, an accidental association without connection to objective reality, 
or as an omen (harbinger) of a square.
20 Cf. also: “Flammarion avait imaginé autrefois un observateur qui s’éloignerait de la Terre avec 
une vitesse plus grande que celle de la lumière; pour lui le temps serait changé de signe. L’histoire 
serait retournée et Waterloo précéderait Austerlitz. Eh bien, pour cet observateur, les eff ets et les 
causes seraient intervertis; l’équilibre instable ne serait plus l’exception; à cause de l’irréversibilité 
universelle, tout lui semblerait sortir d’une sorte de chaos en équilibre instable; la nature entière 
lui apparaîtrait comme livrée au hasard” (Poincaré 1914: 72–73).
21  Characteristically, the idea of time fl owing backwards is present in Buddhist mythology: 
see fn 18 above.
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The cosmological model of time naturally gives rise to associations between time and 
space, or at least such associations are foregrounded in this case. Indeed, to say that 
the future exists but is not yet known to us is virtually equivalent to saying that it 
exists somewhere else, that is, in a different place which is inaccessible to us, but whose 
reality is beyond doubt. And also the past may be seen as located in another place 
where we have already been (a place which at that time was part of our ex perience).22 
In this way, the perception of space is carried over to the perception of time: time is 
conceptualized in spatial models and spatial categories.23 The association of space and 
time is a widespread, if not universal, phenomenon.
Now we are justified in posing a question: why is it that time is perceived in spatial 
categories and not vice versa? Why could we not perceive space in temporal categories? 
Sometimes we do, but, characteristically, this happens only when we discuss linear 
(one-dimensional) space: thus, for example, distance may be measured in terms of the 
time which is required to cover it (cf., e.g.: “The distance between Oslo and Bergen is 
seven hours”, etc.).
The experience of perceiving space is certainly simpler and more elementary than 
the experience of perceiving time. Space is perceived empirically with our senses, 
whereas time is perceived by cognition. Our sense organs experience and assimilate 
space, whereas it is our consciousness that must experience and assimilate time.24
22 As St Augustine put it in his Confessions (IX, 23), “[…] if the future and the past exist, I 
want to know where they are” (Augustine 1963[ca 400]: 271).
23 Cf., in this connection, Brihadaranyaka Upanishad (III, 8: 3–4): “She said: “Yajnavalkya, 
that which is above the sky, which is below the earth, which is between sky and earth, – that 
which men speak of as past, present and future: on what is that woven, warp and woof?”. He 
said: “Gargi, that which is above the sky, which is below the earth, which is between sky and 
earth, – that which men speak of as past, present and future: that is woven on space, warp 
and woof ”” (Zaehner 1968: 55–56; cf. Radhakrishnan 1953: 231). In his commentary to this 
passage, Stcherbatskoj (1903–1909, II: 53, cf. 56) writes: “Brahman is the essence and cause of 
all that exists. He is the source of space, and time was created from space”.
 According to Stoics, time measures the movement of the universe, which is understood as 
movement in space (Diogenes Laertius 1931–1938[ca 240], II: 245; Chrysippus 1964[ca 206 
BC]: 164, no. 509). In On the Creation, Philo defi nes time as “a measured space determined by 
the world’s movement” (Philo 1929–1962[ca 50], I: 21;) cf. also his Th e Eternity of the World, 4, 
52–54 (Philo 1929–1962[ca 50]., IX: 186–189, 220–223). Here also space appears as a primary 
concept in relation to time.
24 For this reason, events of the external and internal worlds occur in time, whereas only 
objects of the external world are found in space. Indeed, “[…] our judgments concerning time 
and events in time appear themselves to be “in” time, whereas our judgments concerning space 
do not appear in any obvious sense to be in space” (Whitrow 1980: 2). Kant (1910–1975, III: 60) 
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Man becomes aware of space by moving in space, by changing his position, that is, 
he correlates his perceptive and kinetic experience in order to make conclusions about 
space. Those conclusions can be then generalized and extrapolated: the experience of 
perceiving a concrete space can be extended to space as such.
The perception of time, in contrast, is abstracted from direct sense perceptions 
since a person cannot change his position in time as he may in space. For this reason, 
it requires a higher level of abstraction.
The experience of perceiving space is thus gnoseologically primary. Consequently, 
it may determine the perception of time which may be conceptualized as a kind of 
writes in Kritik der reinen Vernuft  (I, §6): “Die Zeit ist die formale Bedingung a priori aller 
Erscheinungen überhaupt. Der Raum, als die reine Form aller äußeren Anschauung ist als 
Bedingung a priori bloß auf äußere Erscheinungen eingeschränkt [...] ist die Zeit eine Bedingung 
a priori von aller Erscheinung überhaupt, und zwar die unmittelbare Bedingung der inneren 
(unserer Seelen) und eben dadurch mittelbar auch der äußeren Erscheinungen”. 
 Th e concept of existence (being) seems to be primarily associated with space rather than 
with time (cf. fn 15 above): in other words, the primary conditions for existence are spatial, 
rather than temporal. If existence in space may be viewed as something which is a priori clear, 
then existence in time must be conceptualized. In distinction to space, time presupposes the 
possibility of changing an object and thus the problem of existence in time comes down to 
a problem of identifi cation, the acknowledgement of the object in its new state as the same 
object that existed earlier. In Kritik der reinen Vernuft  (I, §5), Kant (1910–1975, III: 59) wrote 
in this regard: “daß der Begriff  der Veränderung und, mit ihm, der Begriff  der Bewegung (als 
Veränderung des Orts) nur durch Zeitvorstellung möglich ist; daß, wenn diese Vorstellung nicht 
Anschauung (innere) a priori wäre, kein Begriff , welcher es auch sei, die Möglichkeit einer 
Veränderung, d.i. einer Verbindung contradictorisch entgegengesetzter Prädicate (z.B. das Sein 
an einem Orte und das Nichtsein eben desselben Dinges an demselben Orte) in einem und 
desselben Objecte begreifl ich machen könnte. Nur in der Zeit können beide contradictorisch-
entgegengesetzte Bestimmungen in einem Dinge, nämlich nach einander, anzutreff en sein”. Th e 
Buddhist philosophical tradition, which does not acknowledge existence in time, has another 
answer to this question: “all being exists in reality only for a single moment, and in the next 
moment we have an entirely new being” (Stcherbatskoj 1903–1909, II: 89, cf. 72).
Th us, the question of existence in time may be answered in various ways. Our response is 
determined by our attitude towards the possibility or the impossibility of identifying changing 
objects or of identifying diff erent existences. Characteristically, the problem of identifi cation 
does not arise when considering the existence of objects in space (otherwise it becomes 
the problem of classifi cation). Th e very procedure of identifi cation implicitly requires the 
correlation of the objects being identifi ed in time, but not in space. In fact we may recognize 
two objects as being the same when they are in diff erent times, but normally cannot do this 
if they are simultaneously in diff erent places. In other words, a single object cannot be in 
diff erent places at the same time, but it can be in one and the same place at diff erent times. 
Th e distinction between space and time is determined here by the fact that the very ability to 
make identifi cations belongs to the perceiving subject who perceives space directly and time 
indirectly.
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space, that is, conceptualized in spatial categories. Characteristically, as Piaget has 
noticed, a child conceptualizes ‘before’ and ‘after’ as spatial rather than temporal 
categories (see Piaget 1950: 136).
Generally, time and space are conceptualized as correlated phenomena (categories, 
forms of being). They are isomorphic and they may be likened to each other. Indeed, 
space is filled with objects, just as time is filled with events; events are in a sense similar 
to objects, they may be regarded as isomorphic phenomena. Spatial orientation (such 
as ‘right – left’) corresponds in a sense to temporal orientation (such as ‘before – 
after’), that is, these types of orientation may also be viewed as isomorphic. Thus, 
space and time may easily be transcoded (translated) into each other.
The essential difference between space and time is manifested in their relation 
to the perceiving human subject. Indeed, space is passive in relation to the subject, 
whereas the subject is active in relation to space. Time, on the other hand, is active in 
relation to the subject, while the subject is passive in relation to time. A person can 
move through space with relative freedom, shifting from one place to the next. Time, 
on the contrary, moves in relation to a person, and that person finds himself in one 
or another time. That is, he finds himself in that time which was earlier perceived as 
the future and which for him is now the present.25 For this reason, time is naturally 
associated with movement in one single direction.
Since time has direction, it is perceived as one-dimensional. In fact, time moves in 
relation to a person in a given direction while a person may move in any direction in 
space. Therefore, time may be contrasted to space as a one-dimensional phenomenon 
to a three-dimensional phenomenon. On the other hand, time and space supplement 
each other, insofar as any event of our world is marked both in time and in space, and 
thus we are compelled to speak of time as a fourth dimension or to speak of ‘space-
time’ or ‘chronotope’ as a general category.26
25 Th e activity of man with relation to time as a matter of principle presupposes supernatural 
powers. In particular, such activity is presumed to be possible in magical beliefs and rituals. 
Th us, a soothsayer (for example, a shaman) can be transferred to another time, and this 
enables him to predict the future. One could also refer in this connection to specifi c Russian 
incantations protecting against an evil spirit, which express the idea of an inverted time (time 
turned backwards). In order to get rid of wood-sprites or some other demons (as well as 
diseases which were also regarded as demons), Russians used to address them with the words: 
“Come yesterday!” (Ushakov 1896: 159–160; Zelenin 1914–1916: 795, 1244). Here the demon 
is being explicitly sent to another time (just as we can send somebody to another place) – and, 
moreover, he is being sent to a time which does not exist anymore, that is, a time which is gone 
away and will never come back.
26 Cf. the same category in early Chinese philosophy: “[…] the expression which is now used 
for ‘the universe’, yü-chou, has essentially the meaning of ‘space-time’” (Needham 1965: 1).
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It should be emphasized, however, that the very notion of the one-dimensionality 
of time is predicated on an association with space, the projection of time onto space, 
the conceptualization of time in spatial categories. If we could move about in time as 
we do in space or if space moved in relation to man as time does, then there would be 
no essential difference between history and geography.27
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Семиотика и культура: восприятие времени 
как семиотическая проблема
Восприятие времени культурно обусловлено – в разных культурах время ощущается, 
концептуализируется и оценивается по-разному. Различение прошлого, настоящего и 
будущего является универсальным феноменом, но отношения между этими категориями 
могут отличаться в разных кодах культуры. Автор определяет две модели восприятия 
времени – «историческую» и «космологическую» – и анализирует концептуализацию 
времени в обеих. 
Semiootika ja kultuur: aja tajumine kui semiootiline probleem
Aja tajumine on kultuuriliselt tingitud, mis tähendab, et erinevates kultuurides võidakse aega 
kogeda – tajuda, kontseptualiseerida ja hinnata – erineval moel. Mineviku, oleviku ja tuleviku 
eristamine näib olevat universaalne fenomen, kuid nende kategooriate vahelised suhted võivad 
erinevates kultuurikoodides osutuda erinevateks. Autor defineerib kaks aja tajumise mudelit – 
‘ajaloolise’ ja ‘kosmoloogilise’ – ning analüüsib aja kontseptualiseerimist kummaski neist.
